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Introduction 
Development thlnking and practive in Latin America have been strongly 
influenced by the centre-periphery approach with its heavy emphasis 
on international trade, considered the most important variable in 
the analytical explanation of the origin of underdevelopment as well 
as in the strategy recommended for its elimination. 
It is understandable, then, that the trade policies imp~emented 
in Latin America, and their effects, are of paramount importance not 
only for an assessment of the region's progress but also for fostering 
the right strategy for the future. 
Only a brief analysis of the problem is presented here, in an 
attempt to pinpoint the main issues and their impact on the develop-
ment process; concentration is on the process of polarization taking 
place within Latin America. 
This paper is divided into five parts: (i) main characteristics 
of Latin American economic foreign relations, mainly as the result 
of given trade policies; (ii) principal policy instruments utilized, 
with special reference to exchange rate policies; (iii) trade 
policies of the developed countries, i.e. most-favoured nation 
clause and GATT's role, generalized preference system, discriminatory 
treatment of manufactured and primary imports from LDGs; (iv) regional 
integration policies and the resulting polarization; (v) overall 
evaluation of L.A. trade policies with respect to the region's 
development and with the International Development Strategy (IDS) 
and targets. 
1. External sector and trade policies of Latin America 
It is widely accepted that the Latin American external sector remains 
characterized by the following features. 1 
(a) Slow growth of exports and their unchanged structure, in terms 
of products as well as of markets. 2 
(b) A slightly more rapid growth of imports than of exports, 
accompanied by the lowest possible import coefficient in the more 
advanced countries of the region, but its increase in most countries 
of the region. 3 
(c) Rapid expansion of external, public and private, indebtedness, 
the servicing of which absorbed on the average 37 percent of all 
Latin American exports of goods and services during the period 
1965-69, against 18.5 percent during the first half of the 50s.4 
Furthermore, the net contribution of foreign direct investment 
continues to be negative and increasingly so, riSing from minus 
$2.4 billion during the period 1950-54 to minus 5.3 during 1965-69. 
The net contribution of foreign capital, positive on the average 
from 1955 to 1964, turns again negative ($1.3 billion) in 1965-69~ 
(d) Although Latin American official reserves substantially in- 6 
creased in 1972 (from $2.8 billion in 1960 to 6.3 in March 1972), 
their ratio to imports remained practically constant (around 
31-32 percent), the lowest of all underdeveloped areas. 7 
The combined effects of these elements have caused Latin 
American external relations to be further characterized by a 
sequence of balance of payments crises. 
....; 2 
There is no doubt that these crises mostly find their or1g1n 
in the national development policies pursued in the regions; or 
r§l.tllJ:~}:· __ :i,!! tll~ __ inQons:lf3t~n9j,~s _ Qfth.§!'LE! PQli_ciJ:~s. YE!t _ it seems 
erroneous to select the lack of an export promotion drive to pay 
for the greater import required to achieve the higher income 
targets ambitiously pursueq by most L.A. ·countries.8 
It seems rather that Latin American balance of payments 
problems are the direct result of (i) the type of industrialization 
attempted; and (ii) the large borrowing abroad undertaken by L.A., 
especially since the end of the 1950s, in order to attain such an 
aim. The link between these two elements is given by the prevailing 
internal income distribution and by the political will of the 
dominating classes not to affect it in any way. Together these 
factors explain the types of commercial policy followed in the 
region. 
It is now recognize,d that, from the beginning, the in-
dustrialization of Latin America has not been the result of a 
clearly designed development strategy. Ultimately, even import 
substitution become an instrument of penetration for multinational 
corporations, backed in their effort by the nationai ruling groups 
who see in foreign capital a way to avoid changes that will affect 
their interests. In this process the elite have maintained their 
position, although they have had to accept becoming part of a 
'private transnational class' in which they playa subordinate 
role. 
Graph 1 shows clearly that in the last twenty years Latin 
America has been able to pay for its imports with exports. The, 
balance of payments problem arises only'as a result of payments 
for invisibles, mainly those relative to the servicing of foreign 
capital. And as these payments have been rising very fast while 
the trade surplus has shrunk, becoming negative for the first 
time in 1971 ,Latin American export revenues have been increasingly 
absorbed by the servicing of foreign capital. In this way, the 
large inflows of foreign capital intended to promote the region's 
exports cause an increasing outflow of resources which makes it 
impossible to step up the import of those capital goods that 
would permit the expansion of exports. Based on the wrong 
assumption, namely an alleged trade deficit, the export promotion 
could not be more disastrous and self-defeating •. This result 
is even more evident when we consider the region's trade with 
the US, long characterized by the largest trade deficit of Lati~ 
America. Although the export drive should logically have been 
directed to the US, the trade deficit increased sharply from an 
average $266 million during 1961-65 to 861 m during 1966-70 and 
finally to 1,287 m in 1971.9 , 
In other words, while export promotion has been utilized to 
justify the import of foreign capital and foreign technology, the 
structure and dynamics of international relationships have 
ensured that the profile of Latin American production did not 
change,10 and that the reduction, or elimination, of its trade 
surplus contributed to reinforce its dependence on the centre. 
Important changes in overall Latin American trade during 
the second half of the 1960s include the following. 11 
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(i) Export ~olume increased on the average by 13 percent annually. 
Brazil's e:x:p'ort volume increased most in absolute terms and 
reflected the growth of traditional as well as new manufactured 
products. 
(ii) The terms of trade were on the whole not favourable to the 
region which, through their deterioration, lost $665 million during 
the period 1966-70. This negative trend was the effect of a 
progressively faster rise of import prices ($2.7 billion; Brazil 
being, after Venezuela, the country most affected in absolute terms, 
i.e., for almost half a billion dollars) than of export prices 
($1.9 billion). . . 
(iii) The. service and transfer account shows over the same- per~od 
a deterioration of $864 million with respect to 1965 and a percentage 
change of almost minus 13. Again Brazil was by far the most affected, 
with a loss of $616 million, and a change of -57 percent with respect 
to 1965. 
(iv) The long and medium-term capital account presents a net im-
provement of $4.2 billion over the five years, or an average, in-· 
crease of $844 million per yeaT of which 329 m and 268 m, i.e. 
71 percent,12 went to Mexico and Brazil respectively. . 
Taking these various effects together, it will be seen that 
the region's capacity to import 13 increased during this period by 
a yearly average amount of $1.65 billion with respect to 1965'i a 
yearly change of almost 16 percent to which variations in the export 
volume alone contributed about 84 percent. Mexico and Brazil 
experienced the largest average increase in absolute value, $443 
and 412 million respectively, i.e. 51 percent of the total. 
Confronting the capacity to import with the actual importl· 
volume levels (i.e. imports at 1965·prices), it appears that. t!he· 
latter increased at an average annual rate of 22.3 percent, in 
absolute terms by a $2.2 billion annual average. Brazil's impjort 
volume growth was by faT the largest, in absolute terms ($800 
million average)14 as well as in percentage (73 percent average 
annual change). On the whole, during the period 1960-70, the 
region retained a small margin of underutilizati.on of capacitYJ, 
about.1 percent, although the utilization rate of its import . 
capacity increased by 5.6 percent with respect to 1965. Brazil 
underutilized its import capacity by about 4 percent, second. 
only to that of the Dominican Republic. As Brazil experienced 
at the same time a large inflow of short-term capital averaging 
$188 million, its international reserve position improved by an 
amount equal to 13.9 percent of its import capacity, the highest 
of the region and almost thrice the latter average of 5.5 percent .• 
Brazil's inflow of short-term capital was the largest of Latin 
America, and together with that of Mexico and Argentina constituted 
86 percent of the total net inflow into the region. Finally, this 
net inflow of short-term capital equalled almost 10 percent of 
Brazil's import capacity, more than twice the region's average of 
4.3 percent. 
2. Principal trade policy instruments 
As protectionism has been the policy recommendation emerging from 
the import substitution policy and its systematized version di'ffused 
by ECLA tariffs have loomed large in Latin American practice a.nd 
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their effects on growth and industrialization have been widely studied. 
Although import tariffs have not tended to decline much during 
1972, the ad valorem import taxation accounted in 1970 for 13.5 
percent of the region's imports (c.i.f.) compared with 15.9 percent 
in 1965.and an average of 14.3 for the whole period 1966-70. 15 
These rates do not ,compare too badly with those relative to the 
import Of finished manufactures of the centres at the beginning of 
1972. 
Dutiable Itemsa All Items 
maximum minimum maximum minimum 
World 12.0 10.3 10.1 7.7 
EEC 9.0 8.0 8.7 7.8 
us 13.4 8.1 12.8 7.2 
Japan 12.8 11.7 12.5 11.4 
(a) Data are taken from GATT, Basic Documentation for the Tariff StU&Yi 
the maximum and minimum refer to four different types of tariff 
averages. Utilization of the distinction between percentages 
relat,ive to All Items and Dutiable Items still conceals the effect 
of import tax rates that are prohibitive. 
Brazil averaged 10.8 percent during the period 1966-70, Mexico 
10.9, Colombia 16.1 and Argentina 17.9 percent 0 
It seems that, on the whole, tariffs and tariff modifications 
have not played a very important role, and that the different exchange 
rate policies tried in the region have had more impact on the economic 
growth of Latin America and on the pattern of its international 
relationships, especially with the centre. 
Exchange rate policies have been well practiced in Latin America, 
so much so that, since its inception, IMF has made great efforts to 
impose its liberal approach on the region. 
Overvaluated and multiple exchange rates have contributed an 
important instrument for Latin American industrialization based on 
the import substitution policy. They have in fact enabled the transfer 
of income from the traditional to the industrial sector by reducing 
the prices of imports for the latter and decreasing the real income 
received by the former. Now the exchange rate policy is very much 
linked to a country's monetary policy and multiple exchange rates tend 
to enhance the autonomy of the latter. Multiple exchange rates were 
introduced in Latin America in the 1930s', that is, during a period 
of diminishing international interdependence; they came to limit the 
prestige of IMF and the influence the latter felt it should exercise 
on the region. The campaign for unification of multiple exchange 
rates mainly utilized the argument relating to the need for effective 
control of inflation,16 ignoring the structural nature of this 
phenomenon. 
Only at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s 
did the IMF succeed in practically eliminating multiple exchange 
rates from Latin America, making yet more acUte 'the problem of finding 
a mechanism which would enable each economy to adequately reach its 
external and internal equilibrium. ,Balance of payments difficulties, 
resulting mainly from disbursements related to service and capital, 
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made more appealing the credit facilities offered by the World Bank 
and US foreign aid. Yet the adjustment process appeared complicated 
by the large capital flights experienced by Latin America and the 
continuous inflation which seemed unaffected by the shift in exchange 
rate policy .. 
Attempts to eliminate this outflow would have required the 
introduction of certain controls which, aside from being politically 
undesired, are also contrary to IMF principles and practice and an 
obstacle to further expansion of foreign credit. 
Reduction of inflation would have required, among other measures, 
strict control over the demand structure and consequently of income 
distribution, which again could not then be associated with IMF 
policies. 
It became then important to disparage the IMF rule of fixed 
exchanged rates and to accept in one form or another the idea of their 
flexibility in o~der to attempt to reconciliate external and internal 
equilibrium under rapidly changing conditions. The developed countries 
have more recently followed a similar course when they started to feel 
the pressure of an adjustment process derived from power redistribution 
among themselves. 
The shift from the multiple to the single exchange is also related 
to the Latin American industrialization process. The crisis of the 
import-substitution strategy and subsequent attempts to expand the 
export of manufactured goods, have required at the very least a more 
drastic adjustment of the exchange rate to its equilibrium value, which 
in turn meant a series of devaluations. But "precisely because the 
developing countries' balance-of-payments problem requires an adjust-
ment in cost structure (the reduction of manufacturing costs relative 
to the prices of primary products) and not just a change in the general 
level of costs in terms of international currency, the desired result 
cannot be achieved by a straight forward devaluation of their 
currencies.lln Furthermore, export promotion more than import sub-
stitution needs exchange alterations that would redress the balance 
in favour of primary producers but would also obstruct investment in 
the intermediary and capital goods sectors. 
Although it is correct that the previous exchange rate policies 
with their constant overvaluations contributed greatly to the import 
of a largely labor-saving technology and to a rather excessive 
mechanization of agriculture, the negative effects were less the 
necessary result of the exchange rate policy than of the lack of a 
clear development strategy. 
Furthermore, there is convincing evidence that multiple exchange 
rates provide a better adjustment'mechanism than the single rate when, 
as is often the casein Latin America, the demand for import, the 
supply of exportables, and exter:i1a1 demand, are all inelastic. 
Multiple exchange rates have then exercised conSiderable influence on 
capital formation, consumption and the production structure of 
countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Peru, and 
have valuable contributed to their pursuit of domestic growth. 18 
Unfortunately this instrument has been utilized in Latin America 
under less than propitious conditions, namely, a fundamental external 
disequilibrium and the "general exchange and monetary weakness of 
many Latin American countries. ,,19 If international economic co-
operation would not have been conditional to the elimination of 
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multiple exchange rates, the latter might have resulted in a better 
development instrument than the shaky stabilization programmes 
fostered by the IMF and_undermined by this institution's liberal 
principles. The transition to full liberalization, tariffs and 
fiscal policies was then the only available substitute to exchange 
raie manipulation. Yet the difficulties caused by such substitution 
have apparently been great enough to make these transitional measures 
become a permanent feature of the Latin American economic landscape. 
And while the working ~f the multiple exchange rate had been fairly 
even, the surcharge on imports, exports taxes, and high advance . 
deposits on imports are policy instruments "on which pressure from 
the various interest groups of a country's business community is 
likely to be stronger. ,,20 Furthermore, surcharges, retentions, and 
advance deposits are strictly applicable to flows of goods and cannot 
affect flows of capital, as was the case with multiple exchange rates. 
As a result, the change of the exchange rate policy has tended to 
bring together "the interest of foreign private capital and of Latin 
America's economic leaders", which eventually "may lead to a burden 
for this region. 1121 
Difficulty in understanding what the IMF intended to achieve by 
advising this substitution, may force many to believe that the main 
aim of the IMF and of the World Bank has been to gain control' over 
most Latin American economies. 
In fact, while most Latin American countries - 15 - have agreed 
to avoid the use of exchange restrictions, multiple exchange rates 
and discriminatory currency arrangements have become permanent 
instruments in their attempt to equilibrate their balances of pay-
ments, although it seems that their growth has not been enhanced nor 
are their external sectors closer to equilibrium. 
To sustain that "Latin America takes as a heritage into the 1970s 
an exchange rate system with a structure substantially biased against 
non-traditional exports",22 implies forgetfulness of Kaldor's warning 
about the non~existence of a viable single exchange rate, as has been 
demonstrated by those countries .which have continuously devaluated 
their currencies. The inflationary pressure has not yet abated23 as 
it originates in the internal structures of these countries and iri 
their position within the international system. 
3. Developed countries' trade policies 
There is mounting agreement that the trade policies of developed 
countries are (i) the most glaring contradiction to their public 
declarations concerning their desire to help the Third World to 
develop; and (ii) basically designed to obstruct such development 
in order to maintain the underdeveloped count.ries' dependence. 
This is demonstrated by the resistence opposed by DCs to the 
(i) establishment of commodity agreements relative to LDCs primary 
products; (ii) elimination or reduction of subsidized agricultural 
exports which ~resently limit the natural outlet of LDCs similar 
products; (iii) elimination of all policies (tariff, quotas, taxes) 
which discriminate against LDCs competitive exports of manufactured 
products. To these problem areas strictly concerned with trade 
policies, it seems necessary to add: (iv) the disturbing trade policy 
elements embodied in DCs export credit policies, especially the 
interest practiced and the tying; and (v) the lack, aside from the 
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GPS, of a set of measures to compensate LDCs for the biased working 
of the prevailing market price constellation. 
The expansion of the EElC has also been cmmcterized by an in-
creasing proliferation of special preferences (the EElC of the Six 
established preferentia~. and reciprocal agreements with 28 other 
countries).24 This not only played havoc with the original idea on 
which the Community was built, namely, the creation of conditions for 
trade liberalization,25 but has strongly reduoed the role of GATT 
regulations by making the application of its basic principle - the 
most favoured nation clause - more and more an exception. As this 
principle was a pivot of the international order established after 
World War II under the intense labor of the US, which also benefited 
most from it, it is not surpriSing that that country has protested 
against such practice and has recently publicly warned that if the 
trend does not change it will find it necessary to create its own 
preferential area to protect ~ts commercial position. 26 
The generalized preference system, recently agreed upon, for 
products originating in the peripheries, certainly attempts to reduce 
the discriminatory impact of many of these special preferences. Yet,' 
its application is not so general as might be expected. Its im-
plementation by EElC and Japan (the U.S. after resisting the granting 
of GPS has only agreed, mainly as a defense strategy against EEC's 
earlier action, to send the relative bill - excluding shoes, textiles 
and oil from GPS - to Congress, although this has not yet been done 
nor is it apparently imminent) is on an extremely restrictive basis, 
as "it does not provide for preferences granted in common by all 
developed countries: each of these has its own scheme 11.27 Further-
more it does not provide access to the centre's markets for 'sensitive' 
goods of the peripheries. This was recognized by Mansholt who rightly 
considered that the Community's offers have been less generous in the 
agricultural than in the industrial field '~ecause no other industrial 
community has so many farming interests to safeguard as we have." In 
other words, the cost of building the community is passed on the Third 
World, following a very common practice. 
The right to restrict imports from the peripheries remains, 
through the escape clauses, firmly wi~h the centres, showing that in 
spite of the limited nature of the,GPS and the small financial gain 
that it will produce for the peripheries ,28 the centres are not 
willing to undercut one of the main sources of their powe,r, namely, 
trade. 
Reverse preferences (i.eo, the preference accorded to REC and UK 
products by Associated and Commonwealth countries respectively} also 
represent a difficult problem to be solved as they are also related 
to financial and technical assistance. The problem is more serious 
not only for REC Associated African countries but also for the 
Commonwealth African and Caribbean countries which have a choice of 
association. 
Finally, in the centres (i) average tariff rates on manufactured 
and semi-manufactured products still range from 7.1 yo 13.4 percent 
of all duitable imports,29 and (ii) non-tariff barriers are rapidly 
multiplying under the most disguised forms; the view still shared by 
some that after the Kennedy Round tariffs no longer matter therefore 
seems quite inaccurate. It is in fact increasingly recognized that 
"the trading system as it stands is not adequate, any more than the 
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monetary system as it stood before 15 August [197Y was adequate. ,,30 
The U.S. Congress has rightly called "for a review and revision of the 
trading mec:Q.ap.ism;" however, what the peripheries under the 
circumstances will achieve in the 1973 multilateral negotiations can 
be deduced from the importance that the high-level OECD Report31 (the 
Rey Report) gives to "the developing countries": 8 out of 168 pages! 
The report stress the point so dear to OECD members, namely, that 
"steady growth in the economies of the developed countries is an in-
dispensable precondition for increasing markets for the exports of 
developing countries. ,,32 It then adds that as "it seems difficult 
to foresee a spectacular increase in their fJ;nciJ export earnings"33 
of primary products, these countries should concentrate their efforts 
on the export of manufactured goods, in this aided by GPS (the 
limitations of which have just been indicated), and on encouraging 
the inflow of private investment, which "has made a very useful 
contribution to development, and to the growth in export earnings. ,,34-
In other words, more of the same remedy. 
4. Regional integration and the polarization process 
In the 1960s regional integration was conceived mainly as a strategy 
with which to overcome the limitation that the size of national 
markets placed on the achievement of economies of scale, thus to 
enhance the industrialization of the countries concerned o 35 It implied 
extension to the region of economic policies which had been previously 
directed to the achievement of some economic development and national 
independence, and which now attempted to reduce the huge inequalities 
among the various countries of the region. 
This target may explain the reserved attitude adopted by the 
multinational corporations which respect to the regional integration 
process, and by the U.S. Government which, until the middle of the 
1960s, "contemplaba los esfuerzos de integraci6n con una especie de 
desoprobaci6n ideo16gica, y de profunda desconfianza. n36 
The change is due to the realization that the various national 
upper-and-middle classes together constitute a market37 large enough 
to absorb a substantial manufactured production, rationalized by the 
multinational corporations. The latter did not wait for Governmental 
assent before moving boldly into the continent which, by the 1960s, 
they had deeply penetrated; national entrepreneurs were too slow in 
adjusting to the international dimension so familiar to the big 
corporat ions. 
The political change which simultaneously took place in some 
Latin American countries, strengthened this development; and as the 
integration process became increasingly a function of these -interests, 
the process itself started to assume a different nature. 
Priority is given to rationalization of productive efforts in 
the various economies. As these have not previously been specialized 
according to their comparative advantage, they need now to be sub-
mitted to the working of such a principle. The result is a process 
of geographical concentration of industrial growth and the distribution 
of its 'positive' effects over the region via the usual trade 
mechanism. This process tends to stimulate the growth of existing 
enterprises and also the concentration of their control; in turn 
these reinforce the tendency to form monopolistic and oligopolistic 
situations in most of these vital sectors. 
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Instead of spreading industrialization to most of' Latin America, 
regional integration encourages the location of integrated industrial 
sectors in a few areas. 38 Control over principal economic decisions 
passes to the multinational corporations which present themselves as 
the only entities able to organize and manage operations on such a 
scale. 
If the productive process is mainly directed to the urban 
bourgeoisie (which explains the little attention given to agriculture) 
and to the workers' elite, then the unequal growth resulting from this 
integration no lo~ger matters. It may even become a chosen strategy. 
The increasing marginalization of the masses parallels the 
diminution not only of the national states' economic role but also of 
their political capacity "de interpretar las aspiraciones nacl.onales 
y aglutinar los problemas alrededor de ideales comunes". The inability 
to perform such a crucial task "tendra como resultado limitar las 
posibilidades de desarrollo de la regi6n. ,,39 , ' 
A few remarks must be added about the most important locus of the 
polarization taking place in Latin America, namely Brazil. 
In the 1950s and the first half of the following decade, Brazil's 
exports tended to decline, from an average $1.5 billion during 1950-54 
to 1 • .3 during 1960-64. The rapid recovery that followed was without 
doubt the result of the policy started by Brazil's new government, 
based mainly on (i) monetary control, and (ii) export promotion. 
The first pol icy - reduct ion of the monetary supply and a 
restrained government budget - is meant to reduce the domestic rate of 
inflation and so to reinforce export promotion. The latter consists 
of the following elements: (i) a 'realistic' unified exchange rate, 
which in August 1968 is modified into a crawling peg in order to 
maintain a competitive exchange rate against a still unchecked domestic 
inflation. The crawling peg reduces capital speculation and so in-
creases its productive utilization; (ii) elimination of exchange rate 
restrictions, to be substituted with fiscal and monetary instruments 
(MF Rule VII, 23); (iii) elimination of practically all export taxes 
and introduction of export subsidies, as a result of which Brazil has 
been accused of dumping its products at about half their production 
costs; (iv) special export credits at very low interest rates, are 
added to the subsidies; (v) open-door policy with respect to foreign 
capital.40 Consequently, foreign capitalists who find it increasingly 
difficult to invest in Latin America on the old terms, can now do so 
in Brazil from where the goods they produce can be exported to the 
rest of the continent. The huge inflow of foreign capital has caused 
rapid diversification of Brazil's production, which is geared more to 
foreign markets than to enlargement of the domestic market. Strictly 
linked to this point is (Vi) the pursued wage restraint policy as 
result of which real wages in Brazil have declined since 1964~~ and' 
the income distribution has worsened.42 ' 
The GDP has yet grown from a low average 4.5 percent during the 
first half of the 1960s to 7.5 percent43 in the second half, mainly 
caused by expansion of the manufacturing sector, from 3.7 to 10.3 
percent, and of the export sector. The latter shows the following 
change: 
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a.) P I'€ 1 im inary 
Annual avera~..£at~.Qf gro.wth o.f Brazil. 
1950-60 
1960..;67 
1967-70 
1970-71 
Expo.rt Import . 
-2 .. 0 
406 
1803 
7,,7a 
-1 .. 2 
0 0 0 
19 .. 6 
28 .. oa 
So.urce,: UNcTA.J:), Handbo.o.k p Table 1 .. 5; CEPAL, Estudio. Eco.nomico 1971 .. · 
As fo.r intraregio.nal trade, while Brazil's share o.f the regio.n's 
impo.rts decreased fro.m 25 percent in 1961-65 to. i8 percent in. 1966-70, 
her share cjf the region's expo.rts ro.se from 805 percent to 11 percent .. 
The country~s trade deficit with the regio.n decreased from an average 
$510 billio.n during 1961-65 to. $230 billion during 1966~70044 If we 
co.mpare Brazil's performance with that o.f Argentina during the same 
period it appears that Brazil's percentage change has been higher 
relative to. expo.rt (86 percent and 69 respectively), but much smaller 
with respect to impo.rt (17 percent and 57 respectively),45 which . 
indicates ~o.t o.nly that Brazil is o.vertaking Argentine, but also. the 
latter's greater dependence on impo.rts fro.m theco.ntinento 
The value o.f Brazil's expo.rts increased from 1405 percent o.f 
to.tal Latin American expo.rts in 1967 to. 1808 percent in 1970, while 
the rate o.f growth o.f its expo.rts 9 ioe. 1803 percent during 1967-70, 
is.the highest experienced by Latin Americao 
The structure of Brazilian trade has also. changed: in its trade 
\l1ith LAFl'A co.untries Brazil Vs expo.rt included 52 percent o.f primary 
pro.ducts in 1962 but only 40 percent in 1971. Yet Brazil's o.verall 
expo.rts in 1971 included 82 percent o.f primary products • 
. On the who.le during 1968-70» Brazil Os GDP rate o.f growth in- . 
creased by 903 percent (compared to. Latin America 6.6), the highest 
o.f the continent; the investment rate has been 1207 percent (Latin 
America 8 .. 1 percent), seco.nd after the 1903 percent of the Do.minican 
Republic; the rate of gro.wth o.f value added in manufacturing has been 
1109 perCent in Brazil (Latin America 8,,8 percent), seco.nd to. the 
12~2 percent o.f Co.sta Rica and equal to. that o.f Nicaraguao46 
Net capital inflo.w ro.se fro.m almo.st nil in 1965 to. $1,,8 billio.n 
i]1 1971 (medium and lo.ng-term capital equal to. $104 billion), 
international o.rganizatio.ns co.ntributing fro.m an average $246 millio.n 
. during 1965-69 to $361 millio.n in "1971.. Brazil's reserves reached 
the level o.f $1.7 billio.n in 1971 (102 billio.n in the previo.us year)" 
Co.nsequently, her to.tal external indebtedness at the end of 1971 was 
$606 billio.n and net payments fo.r ca~ital inco.me ro.se fro.m an average 
$237 during 1965-69 to. 464 in 1971 Q 4'{ 
5. Conclusio.ns 
It is now po.ssible to. try to. o.rder the Latin American experience into. 
two. basic perio.dso 
The first runs fro.m the end o.f Wo.rld War II, though fo.r so.me 
co.untries it had started earlier, and co.ntinues until the end o.f the 
1950s; it is characterized by an o.verall inward~lo.o.king attitude, an 
aspect o.f which is industrializatio.n by impo.rt substitutio.n" As the 
latter needs little capital and traditio.nal and co.nsequently cheaper 
techno.lo.gyg do.mestic capital is largely able to. finance ito Fo.reign 
capital is then left to. its traditio.nal secto.r: primary pro.ductio.no48 
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Under thes.e circumstances the overvalued exchange rate and multiple 
exchange rates are .widely utilized to obtain basically two objectives: 
(i) to transfer income from the primary to the secondary sector, and 
(ii) to adapt the internal prioe structure to the internal cost 
structure. Although the latter makes it difficult to raise the export 
capacity of the country so that the import drive finds its limit in 
the size of the internal market, it must be recognized that the over-
valuation produced by high domestic costs cannot '~e 'cured' by any 
uniform adjustment of the exchange rate. ,,49 
On the whole, Latin American experienced during this period a 
relative prosperity which yet did not affect the prevailing and very 
unequal income distribution, so that the latter became the main 
limitation to industrialization of the region. While the multiple 
exchange rate policy was quite correct when there was no choice single 
exchange rate "capable of securing equilibrium between domestic costs 
of production and •• 0 the level of costs prevailing in foreign markets",50 
political inability to carry out the internal structural changes needed 
to bring larger groups of the population into the industrial market, 
caused the end of the easy import substitution and marked the beginning 
of the second phase. 
Given this 'rigidity' of the region's socio-economic structure, 
the only possible alternative is to hope for an expansion of manufactured 
products. Born out of the impasse reached by the import substitution, 
export promotion soon required the help of foreign capital which 
basically became a substitute for unwanted structural change 0 The 
need to import foreign capital and alien technology, and the increased 
lending capacity of the World Bank, forced Latin America to accept 
unified exchange rates51 and the IMF stabilization programs, although 
these are clearly "premised on the explicit awareness that supply 
rigidities were retarding the growth rate" and that these rigidities 
were "in large part the consequence rather than the cause of inflation. ,,52 
Consequently inflation has not yet been cured53 and growth declined 
during the stabilization period. At the same time a large part of each 
country's control over its economic life passed to the Fund and the· 
World Bank and the penetration of foreign capital in the manufacturing 
sector further reduced Government's role in the management of their 
own e conom ie so 
The proposition that export promotion could help overcome the 
limitation imposed by the size of the market to the growth of each 
country, has to be reconciled with developed countries' disinclination 
to import: substantial amounts of goods, including primary goods from 
less developed countries. The conflict is apparently resolved by 
launching regional integration schemes, though under the circumstances 
the idea implies the polarization of production in one or two growth 
poles. This polarization is in turn the result of a simple con-
sideration: if export promotion is to be directed mainly to the region 
itself or possibly to other peripheries,54 not all countries can 
equally industrialize. Selection is also made necessary by the limited 
availability of capital that is needed to carry on such programmes and 
that must be concentrated mainly in chosen areas designed to serve the 
region as a whole. 
The idea of regional integration, once opposed by the US for fear 
that it could enhance Latin American independence, is no~ gladly 
sponsored by the multinational corporations which see in it a useful 
instrument for their 'global' strategy 0 Furthermore, the resistance 
- 12 -
to the liberalization process by national industrialists and by small 
countries has reinforced the tendency of the multinational corporations, 
and by now of the centre's government,toconcentratetheir operations 
in a few countries while pushing forward the de-nationalization of the 
region's looal industries. To overcome resistance to liberalization, 
the 1MIi' receipt relative to fixed exchange ratEls is abandoned, the 
~gional subcentre Brazil is allowed a crawling peg and a series of 
tax incentives and "subsidies to exports, in order to isolate its 
external sector from its yet uncontrolled - because of its structural 
nature - inflation. Furthermore, it has been convincingly demonstrated 
that the IMF's inspired stabilization policies "rather than directing 
resources to industries with export potential, continued the pattern 
of precocious widening of the industrial specturmo,,55 That the IMF 
still considers the crawling peg as "not D." cc,nsistent with the basic 
principles of the par value system" and therefOre concludes that it 
does not "recommend itself as advantageous"56 has not prevented its 
utilization.. The "very generous system of tax incentives" and. subsidies 
to exports, has found the enthusiastic support even of The Economist 
which, putting aside its traditional liberal attitude, praises it for 
the fact that "Brazil is exporting more manufactured products today 
than the rest of Latin America put together. n57 Although there are 
no exact figures relative to the contribution of foreign-controlled 
production in Brazilian exports, this share is put at no less than 40 
percent. Consequently the $1 billion estimated costs of all these 
incentives58 is largely a subsidy of the Brazilian people to the 
multinational corporations. 
The present crisis of the regional integration process is then 
nothing more than the absorption of that idea into the 'global' 
strategy of the multinational corporations with their need to concentrate 
production for the various small national markets. To enlarge them 
would require unwanted structural change. The creation of subcentres 
within the peripher,r appears then not only as an economic phenomenon 
but assumes enormous political significance as it tends to create an 
in loco policy to maintain the status guo, vis a vis the growing 
marginalization of increaSingly larger sectors of theLLatin American 
population. 
The analysis presented here indicates that former acceptance of 
"export promotion was perhaps too vague as to the conditions and 
possible effects of such a strategy.59 The same applies to IDS 
sponsoring of economic regional cooperation, though in this case it 
is recognized that the "removq.l of barriers to their intratrade 0 •• 
is not sufficient by itself 0,,60 " 
The absence of any consideration relative to the crucial role 
played by the multinational corporations and the reiterat.ed belief 
that export promotion is the only solution to mounting debt 
servicing,61 not even once considering that the latter can be largely 
the result of the former, reduces the operational value of the IDS 
recommendations. 
Brazil appears as the countr,r which follows the IDS suggestions 
quite strictly, especially for what concerns its foreign sector and 
trade policy, including "the maintenance of a realistic exchange 
rate" and the "prevention of excessive internal demand 0 ,,62 Yet it is 
clear that not many other Latin American countries could do the same. 
Not only is each country unique but the very logic of the approach 
" 
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limits its application to few poles only. And this apart from 
the question of whether the result of such an approach "is not 
simply an increase in productive capacity but major transformations 
in their social and economic structures. ,,63 
The adoption of such an approach by other countries may not only 
compromise their development, it also implies the acceptance of 
greater dependence and fUrther marginalization.. It implies their 
contribution to the establishment within the peripher,y of a sub-
centre meant to strengthen the hierarchical order which has for 
long characterized international relations. 
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TABlE 3: LATIII AMERI CA: lilAI II iTEMS OF BALAIlCE OF PAYMENTS WITH REST OF THE lYORLD 
1~!11i on: S 
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: .... 
Expo.rts Imports Trade balances '.profits of fore{gn capItal, Current Account ba13nces 
1950- 1960- 1966- 1950- 1960- 1966- 1950- 1960- 1966- 1950- 1960- 1966- 1950- 1960- 1966-
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(10).;.(1) (12)+(3) 
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1'59 1')65 1971 1959 1965 1971 1959 1965 1971 1959 1965 1971 1'59, 1965 1971 , 
el) (2) (3) (It) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (lit) (15) (16) ,(17) 
1 105., 1 1+08.3 1 813.3 1 20'/.8 1 1t21t.O 1 721t.5 -101.9 -15.7 88.8 -19.3 -75.8 -150.8 -12'7.' -96.7 -6'.3 <fl.7 "~.3 
1 561.3 1 514.0 2 451.5 1 61+3.9 1 530.0 2 660.2' ../lz.6 -16.0' -208.7 -135.4 -19lt.8 -355.8 -22'7.6 -166.8 -?44.8 +8.7 +l1t.5 
1 UT/.7 1 631t.2 2 635.5 1 l00.1t 1 667.7 2781.5 7.4 33.5 -11t6.0 -116.2 -260.1 -?80.0 -110.1 -3d1.9 -711t.O 1010.5 ·122.0 
l.ZZ.hl. ~ ~ 2....2ili!. 4621.Z 7166.2 -!ZZ.!l §hl. -~ -~ -2lQ.,1 -~ ..1165.0 -568.4 -1322.1 -1M .. M 
612.1 631.0 829.5 578.4 686.8 929.5 33.7 -?5.8 -100.0 -2').6 -63.4 -135.5 5;4 -115.3 -230.Z +4.8 +16.3 
44').5 613.1 1122.6 1122.3 7d1.4 1053.l. 'rI.') -91.3 6').5 -63.2 -93.4 -193.4 -34~0 -177.1 -119.2 +111.1 +17.2 
309.0 61+1.2 1 005.0 ,)117.6 621.11 968.2 -38.6 19'.8 36.8 -26.6 -ZO.l -13C.8 -58.2 ..115.0 -9It.2 +8.6 011).8 , 
1 956.0 2 557.4 2 799.2 1 lj36.6 1 531.2 2 10;307 519.2 1 026.2 695.5 -560.6 620.0 -661+.2 -89.5 326.4 -50.8 -1-28.7 .. 23.7 
3.326.6 1; 442.7 ~ U!l!hl ~ ~ ~ ~ 701.8 -§.Il2.Q ../l46.9 -!..llh2, -!llil -11.0 ~ +20.4 +.!M. 
88.7 11Z.6 222.7 88.2 ,143.9 m.6 0.5 -26.3 -?It.') -,.2 -7.' -10.9 -8.2 -30.6 -6,).4 +10.4 +8.5 
110.8 161.2 233.7 102.5 173.7 257.7 B.) -12.5 -24.0 -2.5 -?5 -3.6 5.7 -14.6 -24.2 "2.3 +3.8 
10'/.') 166.8 293.0 121.2 IB9.0 305.8 -13.3 -22.2 -12.6 ..(J.Z ../l.l -2G., -13.9 -28.3 , -28.3 010.6 +9.7 
63.' '5.1 165.8 66.8 98.8 2d1.6 3.1 -'.7 -18.6 -6.5 -3.7 -20.8 -6.1 -7.6 -37.3 \012.2 1"11.2 
70.3 119.1 1,)6.0 69.1 126.3 225.l. 1.2 -9.2 -29.1 -?1 -?O -23.2 -3.6 -12.8 -49.4 .Z.3 .. 11.6 
97.9 176.3 332.3 101.5 1,2.4 ;355.7 -).5 -16.1 -2).4 -14.4 .lO.!) -25.2 -23.5 -3J.6 -?3.7 +14.7 "Z.6 
119.6 49.5 4,.4 51,6 59.6 62.8 -1.8 -10.1 -13.4 -3.5 -4., -)'.3 -4.9 -12.0 -4.) 107.0 .. 6.Z 
132.5 176.) 219.1 11,.8 175.' 295.4 12.7 0.4 -76.3 -10.4 -16.7 -2).8 0 • .3 -11.5 -,)2.1 .7.9 t10.9 
ztz.& 1 061·2 !J..lliQ 'lli.:!l. l.lli.:§. ~ 2.:! -22.!2. -l2&Z. -2!!.:l -§l:Z. -l-llil '~-151.2 ~ +Z.:i. ~ 
61.1t 85.1t 179.1 lOa.) 121.8 203.2 .1,.0 ,·36.1t -24.1 ..(J.6 -1., -19'.5 -19.2 -37.0 -42.4 100.Z 0110.9 
122.1 165.8 221t.9 110.8 166.1 29603 11.4 -0.3 -71.4 -16.5 -21.1 -2fS.7 -4.8 -1,.4 -95.11 +13.5 +12.4 
3'.5 50.2 75.2 lj207 60.1 97., -3.2 -,)., -22.7 -1.0 ,-2.1 -6.7 -4.1 -10.4 -21.2 .&.2.5 +6.9 
225.0 21).;3 249.7 244.6 221.7 2)1.7 -1,.6 -8.4 18.0 -4.9 -10.2 -23., -26.7 -16.8 -6.3 ~2.2 ".6 
~O~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
!!.l.2:Z.tl ~ !i.ll1.!i ~ ~~ :!!lli2 ~ .!Jls.g -1 028,2 -1 475.6 -2 442,6 -7.2Qi! .616.2 -UZ:.2 H2.1t ,.16.2 
~ 
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